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This paper explains how the traumatic history narrative put forth through the Lüshun 
Russo-Japanese Prison Museum has proven itself useful to the Chinese Communist Party in 
creating a narrative that not only fosters a sense of loyalty to the state, but can also be used as a 
political ace card. After closely examining the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum it has 
become evident that the Chinese push for pragmatic nationalism, which began in 1994 and 
continues to this day, coupled with a flamed fire against “Japanese aggression” are the most 
active ingredients in the museum as a “National Defense Education Demonstration Base.” The 
paper studies the history and curatorial design of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, 
along with a review of the modern East Asian Memory wars, in order to better understand how 
the museum contributes to the overall national narrative of patriotic heritage. Ultimately, the 
paper argues that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is used to create and encourage a 
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Imprisoned Within the National Narrative: 
A Case Study of the Modern Chinese Move Toward Pragmatic Nationalism 
I. Introduction 
This study analyzes the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum in Dalian, China with 
the goal of understanding how a Chinese national identity and a sense of heritage have been 
curated following the Japanese Imperial occupation. (1905-1945) This project focuses on the 
idea of “difficult heritage” that uses painful and traumatic memories to shape the ways people 
remember history. “History is written by the winners,” or one might also say, by the authorities. 
With this in mind, I am interested in the ways museums can be used to create a tailored mass and 
individual identity and sense of heritage.  
Why is this important? In a world alive with endless narratives that create mental maps 
with which people use to navigate life, understanding where the narratives are coming from and 
why people pick up on them can lead to a better understanding of the functioning society. 
Narratives and mental maps are quite complex and exist in a large variety of forms—personal, 
familial, cultural, national, global, etc. Thus, to try to understand any one narrative and its 
impacts is a daunting task to say the least. The aim of this paper is to closely examine the use of 
narrative, especially historical narrative, employed by the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison 
Museum to encourage patriotic sentiments in Chinese nationals who view the exhibition. By 
looking at the support that has been given to the museum, the specific narratives that have been 
curated through the exhibitions, and how viewers have responded to the museum, a better 
understanding of Chinese heritage will emerge. 
Why the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum? There are many reasons the Lüshun 
Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is a good lens through which to examine the formation of 
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heritage ideation. The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is one of China’s many museums 
supported by the 1994 push for “pragmatic nationalism” in China. The push for pragmatic 
nationalism has been a response to the rapid modernization and growth of commercialization in 
China in recent years.  In order to maintain the people’s understanding of the state’s legitimacy, 
China has shifted from a Marxist ideology approach to this state-centered patriotism. This might 
sound like moving from the catchphrase, “We are comrades!” to “I am a Chinese citizen!” 
Additionally, the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is rich in controversial history, and 
thus becomes a valuable window into the active memory wars that are taking place in East Asia 
over the past, particularly in regards to the Japanese Imperial occupation.   
 
II. History 
The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum was originally built as an active prison in 
1902 by Russian forces. The site was taken over by Japanese colonial authorities in 1907 who 
continued use of the prison and developed its operations. After the end of WWII, the prison 
disintegrated and was seemingly left alone until 1970 when the Lüshun Revolutionary 
Committee decided to carry out a comprehensive restoration of it. Subsequent years saw the 
prison pass through a variety of local management until 1983 when it was handed over to the 
Dalian Municipal People’s Government. Since then, the museum has been listed as a National 
Key Cultural Relics Protection Unit by State Council, approved by the Propaganda Department 
of the CPC Central Committee to grant “national patriotism,” and titled “National Defense 
Education Demonstration Base” by the Chinese National Defense Education Office in 2006.  
Stretching from 1902 to present, the prison has gone through some of history’s most 
tumultuous hallmarks, passing through the burgeoning process of modernization and the hands 
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of many rulers. In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison 
Museum itself, it is crucial to first understand the history from which it was created and that is 
now so central to the museum’s existence. For the purpose of consistency and relevance, the 
historical overview will focus on the Lüshun area at the tip of the Liaoning peninsula and the 
major historical movements that impacted this area, and therefore the prison/museum.  
a.  The Construction of Lüshun Fortified Port by Qing Government 
Late into the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) of China’s last dynasty and five 
years before the start of the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) the Qing Dynasty governor of Hebei 
province and the minister of trade affairs of the Northern provinces “concluded that Lushunkou 
holds the pass to northern provinces and the door to the capital region”1 as well as military 
significance. As a result, large-scale construction of the Lushun Fortified Port commenced “after 
gaining approval from the government” for the defense against invasion. By the winter of 1890, 
construction was complete on the Lushunkou shipyard, the Square Dashi Dock, nine factories for 
ship maintenance and repair, and ten-odd coastal fortresses. As one of the two bases and the sole 
major warship maintenance base in the Northern Fleet, according to The Spectacle of 
Lushunkou, the Port of Lüshun became known as the “First Fortified Port in East Asia” with its 
15,000 stationed ground and navy soldiers.2  
b.  The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Fall of Lüshun 
 Despite the esteemed reputation, the Port of Lüshun did not last long under the Qing rule. 
By 1894 China was at war with Japan over the Korean Peninsula, putting to test the effectiveness 
of the Qing dynasty’s reforms. “Outdated equipment, insufficient munitions, and poorly trained 
officer corps doomed the Chinese to failure, and on 17 September 1894 Japan sent the majority 
                                                        
1 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, Dalian Formal Museum Culture Communications Co., Ltd., 2002, p. 7.  
2 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 7. 
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of the Beiyang [Qing] Fleet to the ocean floor.”3 Or as The Spectacle of Lushunkou, a Chinese 
publication on local tourism, recounts, “on September 17th, the Qing Northern Fleet suffered a 
setback.” The following winter, Japanese forces pressed through Korea into Manchuria 
advancing the battle lines. On November 21st, the Japanese overtook the Port of Lüshun followed 
by a four-day massacre in which twenty thousand Chinese civilians were killed.4 By April of 
1895, the Qing court was ready to sue for peace.5  
c.  The Seven-year Tzarist-Russian Occupation of Lüshun 
 In March 1898, the Qing government signed two treaties with Tzarist-Russia entitled, 
“Treaty of the Lease of Luda” and “The Second Treaty of the Lease of Luda,” allowing the 
Russians to occupy the Lüshun/Dalian area for seven years. (“Luda” was the name used to refer 
to the combined cities of Lüshun and Dalian.) During that time, the Tzarist-Russian troops forced 
thousands of Chinese civilians to build railways, strongholds, forts, and other buildings, 
including the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.6  
d.  The Russian-Japanese War in Lüshun 
 From 1904 to 1905 the Tzarist-Russian Empire engaged with the Japanese Empire in a 
battle, much like the Sino-Japanese War, over the Korean and Manchurian territories. 
Interestingly, Japan’s conquest over Russia marked a pinnacle moment in history as the first non-
Western nation to defeat an imperial Western power, thus proving that the ability to modernize 
was not dependent on race. Following the defeat of Tzarist-Russia, Japan occupied Lüshun for 
forty years, until the fall of the Japanese Empire in 1945. During the occupation, Japan 
                                                        
3 David Kenley, Modern Chinese History, Association for Asian Studies,  Inc., p. 33.  
4 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 8. 
5 Kenley, p. 33.  
6 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 9. 
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developed vast infrastructure and industry in the colonies, Lüshun was no exception. One of the 
developments was the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.  
e.  The Liberation of Lüshun in 1945  
The year 1945 marks a major turning point in history for the world as the end of the 
Second World War. For Lüshun it was no less of an important day. The Japanese Imperial 
surrender meant that Manchuria—and therefore Lüshun—was no longer a Japanese colony. 
About a week after the surrender, the Soviet Red Army came to garrison Lüshun to disarm 
Japanese troops, and thus “Lüshun was returned to the motherland.” According to the “Sino-
Soviet Friendship Treaty” and the “Agreement on Lüshun,” the area of Lüshun would serve as 
the base of the Soviet Navy.7  
The year 1950 saw more treaties signed between the two communist nations that 
eventually entailed the Soviet forces to end military control over the Luda region and assume 
garrison duties. In 1954, Chinese and Soviet leaders, including Mao Zedong and Nikita 
Khrushchev, signed the “Sino-Soviet Joint Communique Concerning the Withdrawal of the 
Soviet Troops from the Jointly-Utilized Lüshun Naval Base and the Return of it to the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for Sole Administration.”8 
f.  The Transition of Lüshun to China  
Early in 1955, under commission from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the Third Formation of the Chinese People’s Volunteers returned from Korea to take 
charge of Lüshun’s defense. The Chinese Communist Party also sent Chinese forces from other 
departments to help garrison Lüshun who were met by the Soviet troops in Lüshun.9 The formal 
transition of defense between the Chinese and the Soviet troops took place in February 1955 and 
                                                        
7 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 12. 
8 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 13. 
9 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 14. 
  
 6 
by April that year, the People’s Liberation Army was responsible for the defense of Lüshun. On 
May 26th, the last group of garrison, the senior generals and staff member of the command of the 
Soviet troops returned home by train, marking the success of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops 
from Lüshun.10 Lüshun was at long last returned to China where it has grown under the Chinese 
Community Party until present day. 
 
III. Memory Wars 
What are “memory wars” and how much of this paper intersects with this topic? Today, 
just short of seventy-five years after the end of World War II, there are still many people alive 
who remember the numerous atrocities that came with the war. Specifically, for most of North 
East China, this means there are folks who remember life lived under the colonial rule of 
Imperial Japan. Some of the memories might be pleasant, but it is the unpleasant ones that have 
largely lived on and grown in the lives of the survivors, their respective generations, and the 
general cultural aura around them. Much of this could very likely be a result of holding a sour 
grudge. However, there is much evidence that shows that anti-Japanese sentiments have been 
encouraged on a structural level, including forms such as marketing techniques, propaganda, and 
education so as to benefit the state in securing its authority over the people by means of loyalty 
via a strong sense of heritage. Scholar Zheng Wang examines this matter thoroughly in his book, 
Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign 
Relations.11  
At the 2004 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperate meeting Hu Jintao, the sixth president of 
the People’s Republic of China, stated, “To treat history appropriately is the only way to 
                                                        
10 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, p. 16.  
11 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, 
Columbia University Press, 2014.  
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translate historical burden into power of moving ahead.”12 Hu Jintao proceeded to discuss “the 
root cause for the difficulties of bilateral political relations” between China and Japan—the 
disputed visit of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine. Hu Jintao’s speech is a glimpse into 
the ongoing historical memory war between the East Asian nations China, Japan, and Korea.  
Difficulty reconciling the past between these nations, particularly regarding the Japanese 
Imperial legacy in East Asia during the modern period, has lead rise to international attention and 
domestic responses in a variety of forms. The so-called East Asian memory wars are one of the 
most vibrant historical memory wars of the contemporary era and often lead to conflict on 
political, social, and economic grounds. The conflict is often referred to by titles such as the 
“memory problem,” the “War of Resistance Against Japan,” “memory war,” and so on. For the 
purposes of this paper, the issue will henceforth be referred to as “memory war.” In order to 
better understand the complexities of the East Asian Memory Wars, a general understanding of 
“memory war” as a concept is due.  
 Beyond the psychological nature of how the human brain “remembers,” the phenomena 
of memory is a powerful force in personal, social, and political realms.  Memory has the power 
to unite or divide, depending on how it is used. Memory and history are closely affiliated; one 
might even argue that history is a collection of memories. It has been stated that,  
“History provides us with a vantage point, not for recovering or discovering the past but 
for entering into a dialogue with. Remembering in this sense conceives of history not as a 
constraint of the present but rather as a compelling moment for crucial viewpoints to be 
                                                        




constructed for critical purposes. History, therefore, becomes a source of imaginative 
power.” 13 
In their thesis titled, “The Memorialization of Historical Memories in East Asia,” Bo 
Ram Yi points out that scholars have recognized three main tracks for how history is used. “First, 
memory is utilized as a tool. […] Secondly, the field appears to examine the relationship 
between memory and identity from national, regional, and supranational identities. Third, there is 
consideration of whether individuals and civil society members are aware of what is 
happening.”14 Keeping these three tracts in mind will be helpful as the author examines the use 
of historical narrative in the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, particularly how narrative 
helps formulate patriotic heritage.  
a.  Collective, Historical, and Official Memory  
There are three prominent types of memory to consider: collective memory, historical 
memory, and official memory. To describe these in layman terms, one might compare collective 
memory to an inside joke—it only exists within the consciousness of those who can remember 
the joke as it originally occurred. As Bo Ram Yi states, “collective memory contends that the 
past is not about whether the truth is being recognized or remembered, but, rather, the 
recollection of a memory is socialized based on the group.”15 Collective memory is often tied to 
the socialization of a group bound together by a shared memory. 
On the other hand, one might compare historical memory to a book of jokes—a recording 
that is not dependent on the one participating in the joke to have a personal memory of how it 
originally occurred. Better put, historical memory is “how we can participate in collective 
                                                        
13 Bo Ram Yi, p. 21. 
14 Bo Ram Yi, pp. 21-22. 
15 Bo Ram Yi, p. 14. 
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remembering of events we did not personally experience.”16 Where collective memory is related 
to a direct experience, historical memory often represents the culture of a current social 
community as a reflection of the community’s past. Finally official memory is that which is 
written by powers at hand. Official history can be understood as the status quo or establishment 
history. As Carol Gluck puts it, official memory “includes all official forms of national history, 
whether produced by the government, the educational bureaucracy, politicians invoking history 
as they saw fit, or public ceremony.” Gluck goes on to explain that, “in terms of hegemonic 
weight, this custodial group [those determining official memory] wielded the greatest 
institutional power.”17 Being that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is an institution 
maintained by the Chinese government, it is undoubtedly predicated by official memory 
determined by the CCP, although it does also contain elements from all three types of memory. 
How is the understanding of memory relevant to this paper? The simple answer is, 
history is political and it was largely politics that formulated the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison 
Museum as a vessel for memory. Thus, an understanding of memory and politics will allow for a 
deeper understanding the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Although the contentious 
period of history involved more nations than just Japan, China and Korea, this paper focuses 
most closely on China, since the museum that the paper analyses is a Chinese museum.  
b.  Politics of Memory 
 Memories of the past in East Asia have evolved during multiple decades with a vivacity 
that draws attention from fascinated scholars and perplexed observers.  The memory war’s 
persistence is historically rather unique, begging the question, why? It can be argued that the 
memory wars persist because they are being used for political and social leveraging. When 
                                                        
16 Bo Ram Yi, p. 18. 
17 Gordon, Andrew, Post War Japan as History, University of California Press, 1993. From the chapter “The Past in 
the Present” by Carol Gluck, p. 71.  
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discussing the matter of “the clash of histories,” particularly in regards to traumatic events, Bo 
Ram Yi remarks,  
“Asia […] shows hyperawareness on this topic to this day. Although the region is facing 
numerous challenges, at the core it appears to be these historical events causing the 
problems. The past is significant in terms of its influence on the development of national 
identity and perception.” 18 
People in Japan, China, and Korea engage with their complex histories in ways that not 
only impact relations with neighbors, but also contributes, in no small way, to the formulation 
and retention of the individual nation’s patriotic identities. For example, South Korean and 
Chinese political leaders, as well as the peoples of those nations, scrutinize Japanese official 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In moments of particular tension, diplomatic meetings often get 
cancelled and disrupted. Citizens of South Korea and China will often express their frustrations 
by means like boycotting Japanese brands and other such extremes. 
Interestingly, the East Asian memory war might be functioning on more levels than just 
remembering history. The memory war also serves as a means to influence matters within the 
nations, certainly for China and South Korea, to represent history in such a way that shapes the 
interpretation of heritage and the formation of identity. There are many ways that the history is 
being maintained and serving these purposes. Scholars have identified language, infrastructure, 
and symbolism as some of the ways that this narrative of chosen glories and chosen traumas are 
being maintained in the heart and mind of the Chinese people.  
The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is an interesting case study from the East 
Asia memory war because it employs all three of the above-mentioned ways to maintain the 
narrative. Infrastructurally, the site is both a historic relic from the war as well as an active 
                                                        
18 Bo Ram Yi, p. 23. 
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Chinese museum. Furthermore, the museum has been carefully curated so as to evoke patriotic 
sentiment through the language and symbolism used by and for the museum. Because the 
historical wars between Russia, Japan, and China are what produced the prison (which then 
became the museum,) naturally the exhibitions focus on the issues from the wartime history. If 
the on-going East Asian memory issue is a war, then the battlefields are museums and places of 
historical significance, and the weapons are propaganda, education, and narrative heritage. 
Simply put, real and painful memories from the war are being encouraged by the CCP to foster 
anti-Japanese sentiments (to a degree) for the cause of establishing loyalty to the state authority. 
c.  Maintaining the Narrative  
If language, infrastructure, and symbolism are all ways that narrative is being maintained 
through the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, the questions of “who” and “why” remain. 
Considering that the museum is a state-run enterprise, a short answer to “who” is the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Regarding the “why,” the memory wars are being used for political 
and social leveraging. The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, an artifact of the war itself 
and a state-sponsored entity, contributes to both the memory war as well as to the development 
of Chinese pragmatic nationalism.  
Through the protection and promotion of significant items of China’s historical and 
cultural heritage, the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum has not only been preserved 
through the years, it has also been utilized as an impactful tool in promoting national heritage in 
the form of patriotism. Article twenty-two of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
reads:  
The State promotes the development of art and literature, the press, radio and television 
broadcasting, publishing and distribution services, libraries, 
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museums, cultural centres and other cultural undertakings that serve the people and 
socialism, and it sponsors mass cultural activities. The State protects sites of scenic and 
historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and other significant items of 
China’s historical and cultural heritage.19 
 The state “sponsors mass cultural activities” that “serve the people and socialism.” There 
are numerous examples of this including tourism, holidays, certain traditions, and even public 
broadcasting. Every year during the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), China Central 
Television hosts a remarkable nation-wide program that nearly out-performs the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics Ceremony in terms of production. The core themes of the program are undoubtedly 
patriotic in sentiment and pointedly in support of “the people and socialism.”   
However, in regards to this paper, the author is most interested in the section of the article 
supporting “sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and 
other significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.” Each of those clauses have 
been used to describe and justify the worth of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum by a 
variety of sources, including official Chinese sources such as the local municipal government.20 
It is helpful to consider the twenty-second article of the Chinese constitution in relation to the 
twenty-forth article: 
The State strengthens the building of a socialist society with an advanced culture and 
ideology by promoting education […]. The State advocates the civic virtues of love of the 
motherland, of the people, of labour, of science and of socialism. It conducts education 
among the people in patriotism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and 
                                                        
19 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, (Article 22.)  
20 “Japan-Russia Former Prison Site Museum,” Dalian Lushukou Municipal Government, 2013. 
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in dialectical and historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other decadent 
ideas.21 
The second half of this article is quite illuminating, as it testifies to the role of not only 
the museum, but also of memory (and most importantly the partnership between these) to 
promote loyalty to Chinese identity and against anything that is retrograde. Pragmatic 
nationalism can also be argued as an outworking of the Constitution’s twenty-forth clause. 
Indeed, in a speech to the National Conference of Museums, the Minister of Culture Sun 
Jiazheng stated, “When facing much fiercer competition in the cultural field worldwide, 
museums should intensify efforts to popularize patriotism and socialism.”22 The worldwide 
competition mentioned might include challenges to China’s official version of history. Noting 
what is (and what isn’t) curated and exhibited in museums, implicitly or explicitly, informs the 
ways in which the museum interprets national history. 
d.  Pragmatic Nationalism Museum Movement 
In June 1994, the national conference on education adopted a new set of ‘Guidelines for 
Patriotic Education.’ The new guidelines were the first major switch away from Marxist ideology 
toward pragmatic nationalism. The widespread embrace of nationalism was largely a response to 
the rapid modernization and growth of commercialization in China.23 Immerging in tandem with 
the new ‘Guidelines for Patriotic Education’ was an Outline for Conducting Patriotic Education 
that was issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The education 
campaign was directed at: 
                                                        
21 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,”(Article 24.)  
22 “Report of speech by Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng to the National Conference of Museums.” Xinhua. October 
2000.  
23 Edward Vickers, “Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative 
Education, vol. 37, no. 3, 2007, p. 368. 
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“Boosting the nation’s spirit, enhancing its cohesion, fostering its self-esteem, and sense 
of pride, consolidating and developing a patriotic united front to the broadest extent 
possible, and directing and rallying the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics [and] helping the motherland become 
unified, prosperous, and strong.”24 
One of the main outlets for patriotism and patriotic education came in the form of 
widespread official support for “sites of scenic and historical interest, valuable cultural 
monuments and relics and other significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.”25 
The State Education Commission recognizes an ever-increasing number of sites as either ‘bases 
for patriotic education’ or ‘bases for training in patriotic education.’ Interestingly, a figure of ten 
million yuan has been given as the amount that was invested to protect sites specifically related 
to the Sino-Japanese War in Northeast China between the years 1992 and 1996.26  
The promotion of patriotism has resulted in dramatic support for museums, monuments, 
and holidays in China. As a result, former sites have been renovated and improved, new 
museums have arisen, and tourism has grown in prominence among national Chinese people, 
exposing visitors to carefully curated patriotic sentiments. Essentially, a rise in patriotic 
nationalism has increased participation in the very things that encourage/educate nationalistic 
sentiments.  The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is one of China’s many museums 
supported by the 1994 push for “pragmatic nationalism.” In many ways, a sense of nationalism 
allows for a converging sense of belonging—an emotional participation in the identity and 
community of an ancient and modern world power. Scholar Edward Vickers even goes so far to 
                                                        
24 Vickers, (quoting Zhao, Suisheng “A Nation-state Construction: dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism.”) p. 
368. 
25 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.” (Article 22.) 




draw an interesting comparison between nationalism and Confucianism as serving the same 
cause to create belonging among members of society, particularly educated members.27  
e.  From Humiliation to Nationalism  
 Pragmatic nationalism arose in part as a response to the rapid modernization and growth 
of commercialization in China. However, another and possibly more significant cause for the rise 
of pragmatic nationalism was the vivid memories of humiliation that China faced in recent 
modern history.  Some of the many movements of humiliation for China include the Opium 
Wars, the loss to Japan in the first Sino-Japanese war, the numerous unequal treaties established 
with other foreign powers, and the “carving of the melon” division of Chinese lands to foreign 
colonial powers. Facing an array of internal political unrest, China was unable to take a stand 
against the various circumstances of humiliation until the current regime came to power and 
finally brought the nation to a stable stance.  
 The pain of these circumstances has not been forgotten in China. In an attempt to best 
process the humiliation and stay a step ahead of the emotional response to such complex history, 
the CCP has employed pragmatic nationalism as a positive counter-emotion to the shame. Yet, 
the shame is not brushed under the rug, so to say, rather the CCP has inaugurated the political 
campaign “Never Forget: National Humiliation” as a means to engage the shameful memories as 
lessons for the future. In the words of Xi Jinping, current president of the PRC, “History is the 
best textbook, so studying it will teach us to understand the country and the party, and open the 
gates to a brighter future.”28 President Xi has also expressed the necessity to forgive those 
responsible for the war as well as the need to never forget the past.  
                                                        
27 Vickers, p. 368. 
28 Bo Ram Yi, p. 40.  
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It can be argued that China’s humiliation has fueled the patriotic fire that is shaping much 
of the Chinese national—and individual—identity through forms of media, education, and social 
involvement. The “Never Forget” campaign is a wonderful example of how memory is used for 
political strategies. The campaign is also known as “The great war of resistance against Japanese 
aggression.” However, for all the vivacity with which the CCP has promoted memories of 
patriotic struggle for the use of nationalism, the State has been quite selective with the different 
chapters of history that it chooses to engage with and promote. To illustrate, memories that are 
revived and reinforce are predominantly memories from the patriotic struggle against Japanese 
aggression, yet there is no mention of movements from the Maoist era, such as The Great Leap 
Forward or The Cultural Revolution. 
 
IV. The Exhibition 
The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum provides a historical narrative. This 
formerly active prison, intersects with Russian, Japanese and Chinese history in Manchuria, and 
now plays an active role in shaping historical consciousness. It is valuable to investigate how the 
site was used under its respective authorities to understand what was left behind and what was 
carried through the different chapters in the prison/museum’s lifetime. How does the Lüshun 
Russo-Japanese Prison Museum perform as a heritage site that contributes to the patriotic 
narrative being curated in Chinese nationals? Two fundamental components of the museum’s 
existence shall be analyzed: the physical museum and the written museum.  
a.  The physical museum: 
Due to the rich history of the prison itself, growing from Russian, Japanese, and Chinese 
histories, the museum has been labeled by China as a National Key Cultural Relic Protection 
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Unit, among many other titles. Clearly, the museum plays an important role in the “Never 
Forget: National Humiliation” campaign to bolster patriotism among Chinese citizens.  
Located in the Port Arthur district of Lüshun, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China, the 
museum is a prominent tourist attraction at the tip of the Liaoning peninsula. People travel near 
and far to come see the extensive exhibitions of a prison that has been largely unaltered since the 
time of its active prison usage. While in Lüshun, visitors might also visit the many other tourist 
attractions, most of which are other important locations that played their own parts in the Sino-
Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and World War II. These include war bunkers, shipyards, 
buildings of former governing powers, and now posthumous commemoration locations. Most of 
these other attractions play equally important rolls in pragmatic nationalism and heritage 
education. 
As was discussed in the history section of this paper, the prison first began as a Tsarist 
operation in 1902 during the Russian occupation of the region. After Japan defeated Russia in 
1905, ending the yearlong Russo-Japanese war, the site was taken over by Japanese colonial 
authorities in 1907 who continued use of the prison and developed its operations. There are 275 
prison cells total which can hold as many as 2,000 prisoners.  
The museum consists of two main sections, the Old Scenic (site) Exhibition which are the 
general components of the historical prison, and the Special Exhibitions. The exhibitions 
available for viewing at the museum include: the panoramic sand table, the check room, the east 
side cell, the Anzhong root cell, the secret/dark prison, the guard lounge, the guarding 
department/ring guard, the torture room, the watch station, relics room, teaching room, west side 
cell, western check-in room, workshop, triangle, north gate, medical department, gallows, and 
the prison cemetery restoration exhibition.  
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The Special Exhibitions include The Japan-Russia Invasion and Occupation Physical 
Evidence Exhibition, which highlights the forty-year colonization of Dalian between Russia and 
Japan. Photographs and other physical materials “expose the sinful crimes committed by the two 
imperialist countries in Dalian.” (Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site, Baidu)  The Special 
Exhibition of Calligraphy in An Junggeun’s Prison displays the work of a former inmate whose 
nationalistic spirit resisted the Japanese colonists, and is most well known for his assassination of 
the Japanese general, Ito Hirobumi in Harbin 1909.  The Hellfire Display focuses on the inmate 
experience of the prison. This exhibition in particular utilizes the narrative technique of telling 
the stories of individuals. The last special exhibition is The International Warriors Special 
Exhibition in Lushun, which commends the deeds of Korean, American, and Japanese 
individuals who “promoted their revolutionary heroism”29 by acts of resistance to Japan.  One 
such example is the Korean activist An Jung-geun, who is most well known for his assassination 
of the Japanese general Ito Hirobumi on October 26, 1909 and was subsequently imprisoned in 
the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison.  
In addition to the Old Scenic Exhibitions and the Special Exhibitions, the museum also 
hosts temporary exhibitions and a collection of cultural relics. Outside the prison walls there are 
kilns, farm grounds, orchards, and vegetable plots which were used for forced labor. As of 2016, 
the museum grounds were 26,000 square meters with 12,521 square meters of buildings.30 
A detailed account of the museum’s history is as follows. In 1902, Russia began 
construction of the buildings that were used between 1904-1905 as horse barracks and a field 
hospital during the Russo-Japanese War. After the Japanese defeat of Russian forces in 1907, 
Japanese colonial authorities began and developed use of the site under the title, “Kanto Dudufu 
                                                        
29 “Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site Museum,” Baidu, 2019.  
30 Baidu, 2019.  
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Prison Service.” By 1920, Japanese authorities open a kiln, vegetable fields, farms, and guard 
training centers, as well as renamed the site to “Guandong Hall Prison.” Between 1926 and 1939 
the prison was renamed three different times with the last title being “Lushun Criminal Office.” 
On August 15, 1945, the prison disintegrated with the end of the Japanese Colonial presence in 
Manchuria, marking the end of foreign imperial use of the prison facilities.  
There is little to no information available regarding the status of the prison for the 
following twenty-five years after the end of the Japanese occupation, particularly whether or not 
the prison was used as an incarceration facility by the CCP before it was turned into a museum or 
if it was simply left vacant. The next recorded date available of the site is October 1970, when 
the Lushun Revolutionary Committee carried out a comprehensive restoration of the prison site. 
In July 1971, the Lushun Prison Exhibition Hall was officially opened to the public, however it 
was cancelled in March 1979 for an unknown (to the author) reason. In June 1983, the brigade 
handed over the former site of the Lushun Prison to the Dalian Municipal People’s Government 
and in August 1992, the site is renamed “the Lushun Japanese-Russian Prison Site Gallery” from 
the pre-existing name, “The Lushun Imperialist Invasion of China Remains” and again in May 
2003, it was changed to the title, “The Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Site Museum,” which 
remains to be the official name of the museum to this day. The site also maintains the title of 
“The Dalian Modern History Research Institute.”  
This paper focuses on the ways this particular approach to history education—that is, 
heritage-centered education methods that result in a patriotic sentiment—has been and continues 
to be incorporated throughout the threads of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. 
Perhaps a visual will help represent this idea more clearly. Imagine a scenario including an 
operator, a machine, raw material, and a final product. The operator places the raw material into 
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the machine, which then processes it and turns it into consumable products. This idea might 
seem a little harsh, but can prove helpful. If this is the case, then the operator is the Chinese 
State, who is in control of the narrative curated at the state-run museum. The raw material is 
“history,” the machine is the museum, and the final product is the sense of heritage created—in 
this case particularly, patriotism.  
b.  The Written Museum 
 Taking into account the variety of ways to consider memory, including the ideas of 
collective memory, historical memory, and official memory, this paper will now turn to a close 
analysis of the written components regarding Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Through 
the analysis, the author hopes to determine/gain an understanding of how the museum has 
selected specific components of history to exhibit and furthermore, how these selected histories 
impact museum viewers. To conduct this analysis, the paper will study the museum through two 
main factors: information written by, for, or about the museum; and photographs of the museum 
for visual analysis. The written sources and visual photographs are closely analyzed with the 
goal of understanding the museum’s selection and use of photographs, syntax and multiple 
languages to propagate a cultural narrative of Chinese patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments.  
Written information on the museum is studied in terms of internal and external 
information. Internal information is anything from the exhibition, pictures of the museum, as 
well as books from the museum. External information includes articles, reviews, and books 
written about museum, not by the museum. Unfortunately, the author is not able to visit the 
museum during the scope of this project, however accounts from multiple previous visits from 
when the author lived in Dalian will be drawn from along with current research to conduct the 
study. In order to have the most up-to-date information as possible, the photographs to be 
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examined were taken during the time of research—courtesy of the author’s mother, who lives 
near the museum.  
Presently, there are portions of the museum that have been temporarily closed off for 
refurbishing. The main sections of the museum are still open and available to visitors, but the 
areas closed for refurbishing include the infirmary, the execution room, the room where 
experiments were conducted on prisoners, and an exhibition with murals about the killings and 
burials in the mountains. The photographs primarily focus on the museum’s exhibitions, 
information placards, and scenery. 
Obviously, the best source of information on the museum is the museum itself. This includes 
the physical remnants of the prison: the buildings, artifacts, and remaining documents. In 
addition to the museum, there are numerous books, articles, and websites that are either about the 
museum or that discuss the museum and its history.  Particularly interesting are the books that 
are sold at the museum as sources of information provided by the museum, about the museum. 
These sources are posed as official history and are therefore, fundamentally useful in analyzing 
the official narrative put forth by the authorities of the museum. However, before considering 
these books, the paper will first examine the information put forth directly by the museum as 
exhibition material. These exhibition materials (mostly in the form of placards placed throughout 
the museum) naturally become as much a part of the museum as the prison itself and are put 
forth as the official and absolute accounts of the prison’s stories. To analyze this source of 
information, the author will now turn to the photographs taken of the museum for the purpose of 
this study. 
c.  Analysis of photographs: 
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A close examination of the photographs taken of the museum has proven quite revealing. 
Online, there is little to no information available regarding the museum beyond travel reviews 
and government overviews. These sources of information are still valuable, and will also be 
considered. However, the main source of visual analysis for the museum comes from the 
photographs of the museum, and as such, they will be heavily relied upon. Undoubtedly, this 
method excludes certain components of information of the museum, such as atmospheres created 
for the viewers and their responses. Nonetheless, much can be learned from what the 
photographs do encapsulate.  
 The museum has been curated in such a way that visitors are able to walk through the 
prison, seeing the sights of the once-operational arm of Imperial Japan. Thus, the ways in which 
viewers physically experience the museum are through the buildings, cells, prison grounds and 
artifacts such as bowls, clothes, shoes and tools. Viewers also receive information from the 
museum via placards and the optional tour guide or digital audio tour. The placards provide the 
main source of information for the museum. This information seems to fit into a handful of 
different categories, mainly: overviews of different characters from the prison’s history; 
testimonies from inmates or people involved with the prison; overviews of the different rooms 
and departments of the prison; diagrams and illustrations; images of certain documents, for 
example the statistics of the number of detainees; historical photographs; and other information, 
such as poems. All the written information of the exhibition is provided in the Chinese, Korean, 
and English languages. It is not clear is this choice of language was simply a result of the most 
common demographic of museum visitors, or if it were a more deliberate decision to exclude 
languages such a Japanese and Russian because of the adverse history the museum represents 
with these two nations. 
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 Studying the exhibition materials of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is 
valuable because the information is directly a product from the governing powers of China. 
Thus, the information can be analyzed for its propaganda and core theme of fostering patriotism 
in the hearts of Chinese citizens, as they are reminded/educated on the atrocities committed 
against their people and fellow anti-Japanese sympathizers. The first, and possibly the best 
example of this propaganda is seen in the Preface to the museum plaque. (Fig. 1) It reads as the 
following: 
“Lushun Japan-Russia Prison was built by Russia and Japan respectively at the beginning 
of the 20th century. It’s a fascist prison. The primary purpose of this prison was to 
massacre and imprison the anti-Japanese compatriots. The prison is the microcosm of 
modern imperialistic aggression to China.”31 
The paragraph is an excellent example of the pragmatic approach to nationalism that is so 
central to present day Chinese governance. Language such as, “It’s a fascist prison” and 
“microcosm of modern imperialistic aggression to China” are rather loaded and immediately 
engage the viewer’s opinions on the matter, be it positive or negative. Nonetheless, there is a not-
so-subtle agenda to the paragraph that subjectively tells the viewers how they are to perceive the 
prison—Japan is synonymous with evil and oppression, China is synonymous with the victim 
and, as will be shown through other exhibition materials, the hero.   
The mentioned afore categories of information from the museum placards are valuable 
because they are the most direct source of information about the museum and give a sense of 
what the museum curators see as the most important aspects of the museum. Thus, a detailed 
                                                        
31 Photograph of Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, Preface plaque.  
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analysis of the various categories of placard information helps reveal the intent behind the 
museum exhibitions and the tailored narratives they propagate.  
Structurally, the information placards play a natural role of introducing and explaining 
each component of the museum exhibitions. The most basic category of placards seems to be the 
overviews of the different rooms and departments of the prison. For example, when visiting the 
museum, one of the first rooms the visitors encounter is the “West Body Checking Room.” The 
placard for this room explains this to be where detainees were checked twice a day as they came 
and went from the workshops (Fig. 2.) Information placards for other rooms of the prison include 
the “Introduction to the First Workshop;” “the Torture Room,” (Fig. 3) which is a popular room 
of the museum for its particularly atrocious subject matter; the “Guard Department;” the “Guard 
Lounge;” the “Ward;” the “Dark Ward,” another particularly atrocious section of the museum 
and therefore a popularly marketed feature of the museum (Fig. 4); and another “Body Checking 
Room”—to name a few.  
It is important to keep in mind that viewers encounter the rooms and sections of the 
prison museum together with the placards of information, and therefore in a sense, the 
information is as much a part of the exhibition as the rooms themselves. Thus the placards are 
closely intertwined with the prison itself and instruct the viewers how to feel as well as respond 
to the exhibitions. There is little space given to the viewers to assume a narrative separate from 
that put forth by the information placards. However, placards that correspond to exact locations 
of the prison are not the only type of information provided by the museum.  
To supplement location specific information, there are also numerous overviews and 
testimonies from certain characters of the prison’s history, which provide more powerful 
anecdotes and stories for museum visitors to experience the history through. Some of these 
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figures include Tago Jiro, who was the last director of the prison; Guihara Satakichi, the first 
warden of the prison; and detainees’ stories from their experiences in the Japanese prison. Two 
examples of personal testimonies that are given through these placards are those of the prison 
director Tago Jiro, who gave a “confession about hard labor in the factories” (Fig. 5) and inmate 
Sui Xuemin, who recounts some of his experiences being tortured. (Fig. 6) The testimony from 
Tago Jiro reads,  
“I ordered my subordinates to prepare meal of putrid chaff and husked kaoliang 
[sorghum] with a lot of sand for the detained Chinese patriots and unarmed residents and 
force them to do strenuous labor at fifteen factories […] for more then ten hours per day.” 
(Fig. 5)  
This testimony was clearly selected and exhibited by the museum curators to underscore 
the cruel treatment of the Chinese at the hand of the Japanese rulers. This testimony can be easily 
compared to another testimony exhibited, that of Sui Xuemin, a “victim” of the prison, who 
shares experiences of his tortures suffered while at the prison.  
“In June 1937, the Japanese seized me because I had worked for the communist party and 
detained me to the Lushun Prison. Japanese guards tied me to the tiger bench and hit me 
with bamboo filled with lead until I lost my consciousness. They continued to do this on 
an every-other-day basis. This torture was named ‘open the old wound.’ I was imprisoned 
for three months, suffered one and a half months beating. So far, there are many scars on 
my body.” (Fig. 6) 
Other similar placards of personal testimonies exist throughout the museum. These 
personal testimonies of the harsh treatments experienced at the prison contribute to the overall 
narrative that the Chinese were victims of the violent and oppressive Japanese. The result is an 
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emotional response of pity for the prison victims and indignation toward the violent behaviors of 
the Japanese.  
Similar to the personal testimonies are various poems that were written by people during 
their time in the prison. Each of the poetry placards are displayed as large signs with emotive red 
backgrounds and images of statues that embody the spirit of resistance, perseverance, and 
oppression, all of which synchronize well with the poetry content. One of the poems, for 
example, reads:  
“Passion like a fire rises up, 
Even after endless suffering.  
There is no sorrow in death (for one’s own country,) 
The will is as unconstrained/heroic as strong iron and bones.” 
(Fig. 7, translation by the author)  
 The visual design and exhibition of the poetry placards were not made hap-hazardly. 
They were carefully designed with motives at hand. They represents yet another example of how 
the museum is curated to foster specific emotional responses to the Chinese and Japanese roles in 
the history of the prison.  
Other types of information available to viewers of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison 
Museum include diagrams and illustrations (Fig. 8,) images of certain documents pertaining to 
the prison (Fig. 9,) and multiple historical photographs from the wartime period (Fig. 10.) 
Although these sources of information are not always directly tied to specific aspects of the 
museum like the room descriptions or personal anecdotes, they still contribute to the museum 
narrative by adding layers of evidence that prove the harsh realities that were faced by prison 
detainees. For example, many of the photographs depict prisoners in the various forced labor 
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facilities of the museum. The diagrams and illustrations clarify certain principles of how the 
inmates were treated. The documents exhibited are useful to help viewers understand the realities 
of the prison operations. Two examples of this are the images of documents that state the total 
number of detainees (Fig.9) and a list of production income from 1906-1930 and 1940 (Fig. 11.)  
The variety of information provided to viewers by the museum goes beyond the placards 
and visual exhibitions of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, such as guided tours and 
conversations with museum staff. However, the information discussed above gives a glimpse 
into the purposefully curated product that the museum puts forth to its visitors. The CCP uses the 
museum as propaganda to remind viewers of the brutal treatment suffered by Chinese citizens 
and anti-imperial sympathizers, as well as the victimhood of the Chinese people during the 
Japanese occupation in Lüshun.  
As I was studying the photographs of the museum for this project, a certain photo slipped 
my attention numerous times before I realized a key detail hidden in the image. The photograph 
shows a simple scene of the prison grounds between some of the buildings. Aside from the bleak 
brick buildings and dry winter grass, there is not much to note of the photograph other than the 
contrasting sign to the right of the pathway. (Fig. 12) The sign shows stereo-typical Chinese 
communist propaganda imagery including the hammer and sickle, the Chinese flag flying 
dramatically over the forbidden palace and other iconic symbols of China. These propaganda 
signs are common around popular tourist sights in China so at first it almost blended in with the 
scenery. What caught my attention, however, was the slogan written in big text across the sign, 
which translated reads, “Don’t forget your heart, remember your mission.” Unfortunately, the 
photograph is not clear enough to make out the rest of the text under the slogan.  
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This phrase, “Don’t forget your heart, remember your mission” not only encapsulates the 
heart of the Chinese detainee of the prison, who is often portrayed as brave, loyal to China and 
treated unfairly at the prison, but is also quite reflective of the nation-wide anthem, “Never 
forget, national humiliation: Strengthen our national defense.” The sign underscores the 
pragmatic nationalist narrative that the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is so 
fundamental in representing. This seemingly random sign in the corridor of the museum is an 
interesting contrast to the other more “objectively” portrayed information of the museum, yet 
they both play an essential role in educating the viewer and creating an impactful experience of 
the museum and moreover the history encapsulated in the museum.  
All of these sources of information are connected by the key theme of the Chinese response 
to recent history. “Never Forget, National Humiliation” is an easily recognizable slogan among 
China that thoroughly encapsulates the patriotic sentiment in response to the historical events of 
the Modern era. The second part of this slogan, equally important as the first, is “Strengthen Our 
National Defense.” Uncoincidentally, much of the historical events of this dramatic history 
occurred in or near to the Port of Lushun. As a result, the relationship between the landmarks and 
physical remnants of the war with that of the narrative are closely affiliated. From closely 
reading and analyzing information put forth as a formal narrative (official history) by the CCP, 
or organizations monitored by the CCP, some key elements have emerged.  
First and foremost, the entire narrative put forth evolves around the understanding that China 
was a victim of the brutal imperial powers, particularly Tsarist Russia and Imperial Japan. Many 
of the books that were purchased at the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum propagate this 
perspective. One book in particular, a collection of photographs from the war-time period, states, 
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“innocent Chinese common people were killed by Japanese army as spies.”32 (Fig. 13) Ranging 
between the museum exhibitions, to books written about Lushun, and even to the general public 
response, it is evident that the war and occupation violence from the foreign empires have been 
canonized as the great oppression and embarrassment to China. However, that is not the end of 
the matter. Another reoccurring element of the narrative is a sense of China’s pride and bravery.  
In a travel book about Lushun an account is given of the event on November 21st, 1894. The 
book was published by China Tourism Publishing and was purchased at the Lüshun Russo-
Japanese Prison Museum. Throughout the book, there are numerous accounts of the Japanese 
aggression on China. This account is another example of emotionally charged language that 
characterizes the Japanese “aggressors” as overly violent and the Chinese citizens as victimized 
heroes. “Japanese aggressing army had been successively slaughtering our common people of 
Port Lushun for four days from November 21st, 1894; then twenty thousand more people were 
miserably slaughtered. There were only thirty-six people left in the whole city.”33 The Japanese 
invasion that cold November was no doubt brutal and many people suffered from the 
consequences of war, this is a certain reality.   
Nonetheless, it is interesting to have a direct glimpse into the matter from a Chinese 
perspective from this book. The writing goes on to describe the tenacity of the Chinese people in 
response to the Japanese. “After the 1905 Russo-Japanese War the Japanese army occupied 
Lushun again, wanting to repeatedly destroy ‘Ten Thousand Martyrs’ [the location where the 
1894 victims were burned and commemorated] but they had to give up because of the boycott of 
Lushun people. After liberation the Chinese government renovated it, alerting ‘never forget 
                                                        
32 Guo Fuchun, Russo-Japanese LuDa Battle: Figures, Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 177. 
33 Lv Tongju, Mysterious Lushun, China Tourism Publishing House, 2009. p. 119 
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national shame.”34 The writing portrays an image of the Chinese citizen as a fighter whose 
tenacity in boycotting redirected the actions of the Japanese forces. The fact that this passage 
mentions the phrase “never forget national shame” attests to the breadth with which the idea is 
spread throughout the narrative.  
Another Lushun travel book entitled, The Spectacle of Lushunkou, also provides a fair 
amount of information that perfectly exemplifies the Chinese nationalistic narrative that is deeply 
rooted at the core of Lushun and its history.  The book was published by China Photographic 
Publishing House and gives a thorough listing of all the main tourist attractions of the city, as 
well as a brief historical overview of modern and contemporary events in Lüshun. Many of the 
sites are places of historical significance pertaining to the first Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-
Japanese war and the Imperial Japanese occupation in Manchuria. The Spectacle of Lushunkou is 
a valuable source because it is a clear example of the official state narrative that is portrayed and 
sold, quite literally, to the tourists who come to the city of Lushun and its popular tourist sites. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most significant sight that the book mentions is the Lüshun 
Russo-Japanese Prison Museum. Much like the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum itself, 
this book is valuable for understanding how select photographs, languages (written in Chinese, 
Japanese, and English) and syntax are used by the book to propagate a cultural narrative of 
heritage.  
In the book’s preface, readers are immediately inundated with descriptive and loaded 
language used to describe the port of Lushun, its location, ancient history, and “miseries of the 
frequent tramples of imperialist and big powers.” The preface concludes with the assertion, “the 
                                                        
34 Lv, 2009, p. 119 
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port of Lushun consists of half the episode of the modern history”35 because of the city’s 
prominence in modern history. Throughout the book, the language used to discuss the port’s 
history is clearly articulated so to foster sympathy and pride toward all things Chinese, and 
skepticism and blame toward the foreign imperialist powers that brought “ruin and devastation.” 
The book contains Chinese, Japanese, and English translations of each page. Following is the 
book’s description of the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison: 
“The site of the former Lüshun Prison. It was initiated by the Tzarist-Russian colonial 
authorities in 1902 and extended by the Japanese colonial authorities in 1907. It was the 
largest prison in the Northeast of China then. […] Countless national and international 
anti-fascist fighters were murdered here. Now it is an exhibition hall. In 1988, it was 
approved to be the nation’s major cultural relics under the state protection. In 1955, it 
was designated as the national patriotic education base of the museum circles.”36   
Once again, the narrative and language put forth through this source of information 
thoroughly encapsulate the nationalistic narrative that has been taken on by the CCP in the years 
of humiliation that China suffered through. Today, it can easily be said that China has risen from 
the ashes to emerge as one of the world’s most powerful and quickly-rising powers. The Chinese 
economy is one of the biggest globally, second only to the United States, and their international 
presence is unavoidable. Not only is China a popular destination for travelers and ex-patriots 
living abroad, but growing numbers of Chinese citizens are also spreading throughout the world, 
increasing their international presence. In light of China’s undeniable success from the decades 
after the Japanese occupation, one cannot help but wonder why such a forward-moving nation 
remains so fixated on a past that is more or less past its expiration date.  
                                                        
35 The Spectacle of Lushunkou, preface.  




This paper explains how the traumatic history narrative has proven itself useful to the 
CCP in creating a narrative that not only fosters a sense of loyalty to the state, but can also be 
used as a political ace card. After closely examining the Lüshun Russo-Japanese Prison Museum, 
it is clear that the push for pragmatic nationalism coupled with a flamed fire against “Japanese 
aggression” are the most active ingredients in the museum as a “National Defense Education 
Demonstration Base.” Many sources of official Chinese propaganda, including the museum, are 
used to create and encourage a very specific narrative about China that influences a sense of 
identity for Chinese nationals.  
 As revealing as this study has been, it is imperative to keep in mind that the Lüshun 
Russo-Japanese Prison Museum is not the only museum curated to propagate a political 
narrative. Yes, China is an authoritarian state that maintains absolute final say regarding the 
narratives put forth by museums, but they are not alone in creating and curating a narrative for 
their viewers. Museums across the board put forth specific narratives for specific reasons. There 
are numerous similar museums that are specific to war crimes and/or prisons, for example the 
Seodaemun Prison Museum in South Korea, and Holocaust museums around the world, etc. The 
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